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Social and Environmental Accounting as Symbolic and Substantive Means of 
Legitimation: The Case of HIV/AIDS Reporting in South Africa 
 
Abstract  
We develop an interpretive framework which combines Suchman’s (1995) work on the 
dynamics of organisational legitimacy and Ashforth and Gibbs’ (1990) concepts of symbolic 
and substantive management to investigate how and why public corporations rely on 
symbolic and substantive social disclosures. We apply this framework to the case of the 
HIV/AIDS health crisis in South Africa (SA) and examine the corporate disclosure behaviour 
of a sample of 75 SA-listed corporations from 2003 to 2009. We use content analysis 
procedures to codify the disclosures and devise a disclosure index based on the Global 
Reporting Initiative guidelines on HIV/AIDS to assess whether corporations have adopted a 
substantive management strategy. Our findings suggest that public corporations use a 
combination of substantive and symbolic disclosures in a bid to seek specific forms of moral 
legitimacy (structural, procedural, and consequential) and pragmatic legitimacy (dispositional, 
influence, and exchange). Our analysis reveals that the mix of substantive and symbolic 
disclosures is altered as a result of changes in stakeholder salience, societal attitudes and the 
corporation’s current ‘state’ of legitimacy. Overall, the findings demonstrate that our 
analytical framework is useful in understanding how substantive and/or symbolic disclosures 
could be relied upon to achieve specific types of organisational legitimacy.   
 
Keywords: HIV/AIDS; social and environmental accounting; substantive management; 
symbolic management; legitimacy theory; South Africa.  
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how and why public corporations use symbolic- 
and/or substantive-led disclosures in communicating their social and environmental 
accounting (SEA) practices. Specifically, we contend that Ashforth and Gibbs’ (1990) 
notions of symbolic and substantive management and the dynamic legitimacy framework 
developed by Suchman (1995) can be combined to interpret longitudinal changes in corporate 
social reporting. Symbolic versus substantive characterisations of SEA practices have been 
previously related to legitimacy theory (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995; Day & 
Woodward, 2004; De Villiers & Van Staden, 2006; Cahan & Van Stadan, 2009), but very 
few empirical studies have explicitly adopted Ashford and Gibbs’ (1990) conceptualisations. 
Furthermore, there is continued criticism that legitimacy theory is often ‘fuzzy’ and does not 
sufficiently inform one’s understanding of the motivations underlying the nature and patterns 
of corporate SEA practices (Mobus, 2005; Parker, 2005; Tilling & Tilt, 2010; Hooks & Van 
Staden, 2011).  Therefore, we seek to ‘amplify’ the theory’s interpretive power by examining 
in more depth: (i) the links between stakeholder and legitimacy theories; (ii) the different 
types (dynamics) of legitimacy developed by Suchman (1995); and (iii) how SEA practices 
can be viewed as symbolic and/or substantive strategies to gain, maintain or defend these 
different types of legitimacy. 
 
We contend that the proposed framework can be useful in analysing any SEA practice and we 
study HIV/AIDS1 disclosures in South Africa (hereafter SA) as an empirical illustration. We 
focus on this specific theme for the following reasons. Firstly, unlike many of the broad, and 
sometimes abstract, SEA categorisations, such as environmental disclosures, HIV/AIDS is a 
specific health crisis, which has had a major impact on the social, economic and political 
                                                 
1
 HIV: Human Immunodeficiency Virus; AIDS: Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. 
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spheres worldwide (Dickinson & Stevens, 2005; Fig, 2005). In spite of recent upbeat 
assessments of declining infection levels, HIV/AIDS remains one of the world’s largest 
health crises (Rampersad, 2010; UNAIDS, 2010), particularly in many developing nations 
including SA, where corporations have been participating in efforts to control the spread of 
the epidemic. Secondly, specially devised Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines on 
HIV/AIDS (GRI, 2003) required detailed information to ensure that corporations’ 
performance in dealing with the crisis in the workplace could be adequately assessed. Since it 
is, to date, one of the most comprehensive corporate reporting guidelines on a health-related 
issue, high levels of compliance with the GRI (2003) could be seen as evidence of a 
substantive response to the HIV/AIDS crisis. Thirdly, and within the SA context, however, 
there are claims that the initial response has been slow, ineffective and sometimes limited to 
mere rhetoric, arising mainly from cost implications, tense labour relations, political agendas 
and moral issues associated with the sexual connotations of the disease (Dickinson, 2004; 
Mahajan, Colvin, Rudatsikira, & Ettl, 2007). Finally, previous studies of HIV/AIDS reporting 
(Lawrence & Samkin, 2005; Barako, Taplin, & Brown, 2010) are largely descriptive and 
have not been supported by theoretical insights.  
 
Consequently, we examine the annual and sustainability reports of a sample of SA-listed 
corporations over the period 2003-2009. We adopt content analysis procedures to assess the 
level of attention given to the HIV/AIDS theme and to examine whether the disclosures 
display symbolic and/or substantive features. Our main contribution to the literature lies in 
demonstrating the links between symbolic and/or substantive SEA disclosures and 
Suchman’s (1995) types of legitimacy. We also undertake a more detailed analysis of 
HIV/AIDS reporting in the context of a major emerging economy, where the findings, 
arguably, will contribute to an understanding of how public corporations respond generally to 
health crises and thereby inform the development of future GRI guidelines. In summary, our 
findings suggest that corporations adopt a combination of substantive and symbolic 
disclosures in a bid to achieve specific types of organisational forms of legitimacy and this 
mix of substantive and symbolic disclosures is altered as a result of changes in contextual 
events, stakeholder salience and the corporation’s current state of legitimacy. Our results 
imply that calls for more substantive disclosure guidelines (Bouten, Everaert, Van Liedekerke, 
& De Moor, 2011) may not be necessarily effective, given that certain types of legitimacy 
can be equally derived from symbolic disclosures.   
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, we discuss the theoretical 
implications of legitimacy and substantive/symbolic management. We conclude with a 
proposed interpretive framework, which seeks to link the dynamics of legitimacy to the 
practice of substantive/symbolic SEA disclosures. Second, we review the empirical SEA 
literature which refers or alludes to symbolic versus substantive disclosures and prior studies 
on HIV/AIDS reporting. Third, we present the South African context with an emphasis on the 
implications of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Fourth, we explain the data and methods applicable 
to the analysis of annual and/or sustainability reports. Finally, we present the findings and 
provide an analysis of the disclosure patterns before concluding on the research contributions 
and the implications thereof.  
 
2. Legitimacy and Legitimation: Theory and Proposed Interpretive Framework 
2.1. Dynamics of legitimacy and substantive versus symbolic legitimation 
According to Lindblom (1994), legitimacy is:   
“A condition or status which exists when an entity’s value system is congruent with the 
value system of the larger social system of which the entity is a part. When a disparity, 
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actual or potential, exists between the two value systems, there is a threat to the entity’s 
legitimacy” (Lindblom, 1994: 2). 
 
The disparity in value systems can involve issues that are related to the organisation’s 
economic viability, to the legality of its business activities or to the social acceptability of its 
behaviour (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Woodward, Edwards, & Birkin, 1996). The reasons for 
achieving legitimacy are inherently long-term-oriented and are not limited to short-term 
transitory benefits, such as ‘good press’ or ‘higher brand value’. In most SEA studies, 
legitimacy is viewed as a symbolic resource, which organisations seek and attempt to control 
through a number of actions and strategies, and which is referred to as ‘strategic legitimacy’ 
by both Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) and Suchman (1995). Similarly, the instrumental variant 
of stakeholder theory refers to the need to garner ‘support’ from powerful stakeholders to 
ensure the continued survival of the firm (Freeman, 1984), but how this is to be achieved is 
unclear (Chen & Roberts, 2010). In this regard, Suchman (1995) helps to uncover the process 
by which an organisation gains legitimacy from stakeholders (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997; 
Campbell, 2007) and identifies three main ‘dynamics’ by which legitimacy can be extracted: 
pragmatic, moral and cognitive. Pragmatic and moral legitimacy are the most applicable in 
understanding SEA since they both rely on discursive evaluations (Suchman, 1995) and 
incorporate explicit public dialogues between organisations and their ‘relevant publics’.  
 
In the case of pragmatic legitimacy, the organisation seeks to satisfy the expectations of its 
most immediate audiences and this immediacy involves some form of direct exchange 
between organisation and audiences (Suchman, 1995). These exchanges can be financial (e.g., 
dividends and donations), tangible (e.g., products and gifts-in-kind) or intangible (e.g., 
services and medical support). A second form of pragmatic legitimacy is influence legitimacy, 
where the organisation is supported by its constituents, not because an exchange is involved, 
but because the constituents perceive the organisation to be responsive to their wider interests. 
For instance, the adoption of a charter (e.g., regarding ethical trading) championed by 
activists signals a willingness by the company to “...relinquish some measure of authority to 
the affected audience (to be co-opted, so to speak)” (Suchman, 1995: 578). A final form of 
pragmatic legitimacy is dispositional legitimacy, where the organisation demonstrates its 
disposition to the broad objectives of the relevant audience without necessarily having 
engaged in any visible activity to demonstrate such affiliation.  
 
In support of recent theoretical analyses (e.g., Chen & Roberts, 2010; Mahadeo, Oogarah-
Hanuman, & Soobaroyen, 2011), we argue that the conceptual linkage between legitimacy 
and stakeholder theories is at its most visible when considering pragmatic legitimacy since it 
relies on the existence of a contractual or communal accountability relationship with a given 
party2. Suchman (1995), however, is rather vague on the identity of the constituents and the 
relative importance they might have vis-à-vis the organisation. By contrast, Hybels (1995) 
identifies four critical stakeholders that control a number of resources; namely the media3, the 
public, the financial community and the State. In addition, Mitchell et al.’s (1997) theory of 
stakeholder salience provides a useful set of attributes to characterise the relative importance 
attached to each stakeholder, namely in terms of its power, the legitimacy of its status and the 
urgency of the concerns. Together, Hybels (1995) and Mitchell et al. (1997) offer useful 
                                                 
2We adopt Laughlin’s (1990: 97) definitions of contractual and communal relationship, where the former refers 
to “a more formal context resulting in written forms of recording and defining expectations” and the latter 
“encompasses the less formal context and less structured expressings of these expectations”. 
3Tilling and Tilt (2010: 59) acknowledge that the media in itself has limited resources, but does have the ability 
to influence the decisions of the remaining critical stakeholders. 
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insights in understanding who would be the likely constituents from whom the organisation 
seeks to gain or maintain pragmatic legitimacy4 and why this may, in a general sense, be the 
case (i.e., due to stakeholder power, legitimate demands and urgent circumstances). 
 
Whilst pragmatic legitimacy is linked to the needs of specific groups of evaluators, the 
pursuit of moral legitimacy is based on judgements as to whether a specific organisational 
activity is the ‘right thing to do’ (Suchman, 1995). These judgements are guided by the 
audience’s socially constructed value system and inform a view on whether engaging in a 
particular practice will promote societal welfare. In this case, the organisation can extract 
moral legitimacy by visibly demonstrating an affiliation to moral values and beliefs5. The 
three applicable forms of moral legitimacy are consequential, procedural and structural 
legitimacy. Firstly, consequential legitimacy is based on a judgement of an organisation’s 
accomplishments and outputs. Secondly, procedural legitimacy involves the adoption of 
socially accepted techniques and procedures, and Suchman (1995) argues this can be 
particularly useful in cases where there are no favourable outcome measures. For instance, a 
company may communicate details of how its social programme has been implemented to 
attain procedural legitimacy in the absence of clear outcome measures on whether the 
activities have actually been effective. Thirdly, structural legitimacy refers to the situation 
when an audience perceives the organisation to be “…worthy of support because its 
structural characteristics locate it within a morally favoured taxonomic category” (Suchman, 
1995: 581). In this case, legitimacy is achieved not as a result of adopting procedures or the 
communication of social outcomes, but because the organisational structure reflects intrinsic 
features that are worthy of support; for example, the company board has a sub-committee 
dedicated to address HIV/AIDS issues in the workplace.  
 
In turn, the process by which managers seek to extract pragmatic and moral legitimacy is 
referred to as legitimation. Whilst legitimation strategies are diversely presented in the 
literature (Lindblom, 1994; O’Donovan, 2002), Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) discuss two 
general means by which organisations seek legitimacy: ‘substantive’ and ‘symbolic’ 
management. Substantive management involves significant change in organisational goals, 
structures, processes and practices to “…meet the performance expectations of those societal 
actors upon which it depends for critical resources” (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990: 178). For 
example, in response to the concerns raised by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, corporations can 
invest in preventive programmes and in clinics to support staff and their families. Suchman 
(Suchman, 1995: 600) also identifies a number of substantive strategies, such as seeking 
certification and conforming to international standards, as a means to gain pragmatic and 
moral legitimacy. In this regard, we argue that compliance with generally accepted models of 
social reporting, such as the GRI can constitute a substantive approach because it reflects a 
decision to conform to an external standard of disclosure. The key consideration of 
substantive management is that concrete actions have been performed in the organisation 
(Day & Woodward, 2004). According to Lindblom (1994) and Newson and Deegan (2002), 
these substantive changes have to be communicated to educate and inform the ‘relevant 
publics’, and the role of annual and/or social reports in conveying these substantive acts is 
considered critical. This communication can be aimed at specific constituents (pragmatic 
legitimacy) and/or to demonstrate congruence with social norms, values and beliefs (moral 
                                                 
4Similarly, O’Donovan (2002) refers to the notion of ‘legitimacy-conferring stakeholder groups’. 
5As acknowledged by Suchman (1995: 579), there is an overlap between dispositional legitimacy and moral 
legitimacy in that both refer to the organisation’s attempt to demonstrate an affiliation to a social norm, belief or 
value. One difference implied in Suchman’s conceptualisations is that there is no specific ‘audience’ targeted by 
the organisation in the case of moral legitimacy.   
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legitimacy). Hence, SEA is seen as a medium through which substantive actions are 
communicated in a relatively unbiased fashion.  
 
In contrast, symbolic management involves the use of superficial impressions to project an 
appearance that the organisation’s activities are consistent with social values and expectations.  
Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) contend that, given the complexity of the environment in which 
an organisation operates, including the numerous links it needs to sustain with societal actors 
and the inherent ambiguity of what is a ‘legitimate act’ lead to a managerial predilection for 
symbols: 
“As societal actors become more densely interlocked, and as their relationships 
become more organised and institutionalised, they increasingly deal in the realm of 
symbols and images. The sheer number of relationships dictates that intimate 
knowledge give way to superficial impressions” (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990: 180). 
 
Suchman (1995: 579) also acknowledges that managers tend to favour the “flexibility and 
economy of symbolism” as opposed to substantive actions in their interactions with society 
(also see Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). Ashforth and Gibbs (1990: 180-181) identify a number 
of examples of symbolic strategies: (i) espousing socially acceptable goals, but not actually 
planning to meet these goals; (ii) redefining means and ends in light of the organisation’s 
actual performance and current social expectations; (iii) denying or concealing information 
regarding activities that could potentially damage legitimacy; (iv) offering accounts of 
excuses to minimise any negative perceptions arising from an organisation’s lack of action; 
and (v) demonstrating ceremonial conformity, whereby highly visible and salient practices 
that are consistent with societal expectations are adopted, but no corresponding changes are 
made at the operational level. In effect, SEA cannot be viewed as an objective medium of 
communicating social actions. Instead, the form and content of SEA are designed primarily to 
construct an image of an organisation that is socially responsible (Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell, 
1998) and attentive to the needs of its relevant publics and stakeholders. Thus, ‘rhetoric’ 
rather than ‘action’ is the main objective of the disclosures6.  
 
Whilst Suchman’s (1995) and Ashford and Gibbs’ (1990) concepts have been used in a few 
empirical SEA studies (brief review to follow), there has been no attempt to formally 
combine them as a means to interpret SEA practices from a legitimacy perspective. We 
therefore set out our proposed framework.  
 
2.2. Proposed interpretive framework 
Figure 1 provides a diagrammatic presentation of the links between the dynamics of 
organisational legitimacy and SEA as symbolic and/or substantive means of legitimation. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
If one takes the view that legitimacy is a key motivation underlying organisational relations 
with society and its representative actors, we contend that an organisation will adopt/change a 
combination of symbolic and substantive disclosures and this adoption/change will be 
contingent on: (i) the types of legitimacy it seeks to extract from society and its specific 
constituents; (ii) the changes in societal and stakeholder attitudes to a given social concern 
and how stakeholders believe the organisation should respond to such concerns; and (iii) 
                                                 
6This is similar to the theoretical concept of ‘impression management’, which has generally been relied on to 
interpret the form and content of voluntary financial-oriented disclosures (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2011).   
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whether the organisation perceives the need to defend, maintain or gain (extend) its 
legitimacy. Hence, symbolic (e.g., general, declarative, rhetorical and ritualistic) and 
substantive (e.g., specific, detailed, quantitative and comprehensive) disclosures reflect a 
combination of different features, which could be present in any SEA theme reported by 
corporations. According to Ashforth and Gibbs (1990: 182), tensions exist between managers 
who prefer to offer symbolic assurances to preserve flexibility and resources, and constituents 
who generally prefer substantive action. However, we argue that this may be a rather 
simplistic interpretation of the role of SEA in a legitimation process. Instead, given the 
complexity of an organisation’s relationship with its environment and the multiplicity of 
(often contradictory) demands, managers assess which social concern requires attention and 
how best to respond to it in terms of substantive and/or symbolic disclosures. 
 
When confronted with a social concern expressed generally (e.g., in the media, by key 
political/social figures or following accidents/events), an organisation may first communicate 
that its existing structures already position it in a morally favourable category (i.e., the 
disclosure will explicitly recognise the concern and convey an implicit message that the 
organisation is committed to address the concern). If the concern is championed by specific 
stakeholders, symbolic disclosures can be targeted to these stakeholders with a view to 
conveying a disposition to their concerns (i.e., achieve dispositional legitimacy). In both 
cases, no or limited, substantive information will be reflected in the disclosures because the 
social concern is an emerging one, which either requires time to respond to, or because any 
substantive (detailed) information may in fact threaten organisational legitimacy (strategy of 
concealment). Furthermore, Mitchell et al.’s (1997) concept of stakeholder salience is 
relevant in that symbolic disclosures may be appropriate to manage stakeholders who meet 
some, but not all, of the characteristics of salience (power, legitimacy and urgency). Finally, 
symbolic disclosures may still prove useful in cases, where there are threats to an 
organisation’ legitimacy and where, as a minimum, maintaining legitimacy may involve the 
use of disclosures aimed at ensuring dispositional and structural legitimacy.   
 
Notwithstanding, gaining, maintaining or defending the other types of legitimacy cannot be 
achieved by relying solely on symbolic disclosures. Influence and procedural legitimacy 
imply that some degree of substantive action or change has to be enacted and communicated 
by the organisation. For instance, accepted models of social reporting and social intervention 
can be adopted comprehensively (substantive) or can be applied in a selective (symbolic) way 
to emphasise the positive achievements of the organisation (offering incomplete accounts). 
Practices, policies and procedures can be emphasised in the SEA disclosures as achievements 
rather than actual outputs and performance, and thus be associated with the achievement of 
procedural legitimacy. With regards to the needs of stakeholders, although Bouten et al. 
(2011) cite a lack of comprehensiveness and completeness of social reports, they do argue 
that some of the piecemeal information available can be relevant to selected users, 
particularly those interested in environmental and labour aspects. Hence, disclosures which 
even partially address the informational expectations of specific stakeholders can be expected 
to achieve influence legitimacy because they signal an organisational affiliation to the values 
supported by these particular constituencies.   
 
Finally, and at the other end of the spectrum, the pursuit of exchange legitimacy implies that 
the organisation’s most immediate constituents are scrutinising the SEA disclosures to 
ascertain the practical consequences of organisational actions on their well-being. It follows 
that there is a greater need for detailed information to satisfy stakeholders, who seek to assess 
the actual performance of the organisation as reflected, for example, in quantitative and 
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financial evaluations of social actions. The term ‘most immediate constituent’ also implies 
that such a constituent possesses greater power, motivation and political skill to further its 
agenda with the organisation, with significant consequences for the latter if legitimacy is not 
granted. Ashforth and Gibbs (1990: 182) also assert that “...the more consistent the 
constituent’s preferences are  with those of other key constituents and with management’s 
own agenda... the more likely management is to offer a substantive rather than a symbolic 
response”, which can be illustrated by a higher level of completeness and comprehensiveness 
in disclosures. In addition, and from a broader perspective, consequential legitimacy will be 
achieved if the organisation discloses evidence of social outputs, which incorporate 
quantitative and financial measures and generally accepted forms of reporting.               
 
In conclusion, this framework articulates the links between the nature of SEA disclosures 
(substantive, symbolic or combination thereof) and the type of legitimacy that each generic 
form of disclosure may be seeking to achieve. We now briefly consider the insights from 
previous SEA studies and prior research on the case of HIV/AIDS reporting.  
 
3. Review of Prior Empirical Studies  
3.1. Prior SEA literature on symbolic and substantive disclosures 
There have been few accounting studies, which specifically relied on Ashforth and Gibbs’ 
(1990) dichotomy. Notably, Day and Woodward (2004) analyse the nature of employee 
reporting in annual reports following new legal requirements and found that many of them 
provided disclosures deemed to be substantive (e.g., detailed in terms of how and why the 
companies fulfilled their obligations to employees ), but not consistently in all the themes 
required by the legislation. In addition, a minority of companies only disclosed very limited 
and bland (deemed symbolic) statements. Although the study demonstrates that disclosures 
can be interpreted from a substantive or symbolic perspective, the empirical findings are not 
explicitly analysed in relation to the legitimacy motivation. Cahan and Van Staden (2009) 
investigate whether the disclosure of a Value-Added Statement (VAS) by SA companies was 
a substantive or symbolic strategy. Actual labour performance was found to be positively 
related to the decision to disclose a VAS, and hence the VAS was seen to be part of a process 
of developing substantive legitimacy. In both studies, disclosures are strictly conceptualised 
as being either substantive or symbolic. Ashforth and Gibbs, however, argued that the 
symbolic and substantive ‘labels’ should - at best - be seen as theoretical extremes of a 
spectrum, as “...practices shade greyly from the substantive to the symbolic” [1990: 181].  
 
Other SEA studies do implicitly refer to the symbolic versus substantive dichotomy, but 
generally they only describe one example of symbolic practices in their analysis. For example, 
Campbell, Moore, and Shrives (2006) refer to the ‘good news’ and ‘self-laudatory’ nature of 
the disclosures; a practice which has been reported in a number of previous studies (Gray, 
Kouchy, & Lavers, 1995; Hackston & Milne, 1996).  Reference is also made to declarative 
information (e.g., Ratanajongkol, Darvey, & Low, 2006), which refers to general statements 
with no quantitative or financial information. However, the above studies do not consider 
whether this reliance on declarative or good news statements is associated with the broader 
process of symbolic management.   
 
Further, and of greater relevance to our research setting, De Villiers and Van Staden’s (2006) 
study of environmental disclosures in SA distinguishes between ‘general’ and ‘specific’ 
information. General information “...does not say much about the company’s impact on the 
environment, but it does signal that the company is concerned about the environment” (De 
Villiers & Van Staden, 2006: 773). Conversely, specific information includes more detailed, 
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quantitative and financial assessments of the impact of the company’s activities on the 
environment. Using data relating to 140 SA companies over a nine-year period (1994-2002), 
De Villiers and Van Staden (2006) find that there was an initial increase in general and 
specific information from 1994 to 1999, but that this was followed by a decrease in 
disclosures, particularly in the case of ‘specific’ information. Informed by the historical 
context facing post-apartheid SA, De Villiers and Van Staden (2006) contend that societal 
and governmental concerns about the environment appear to diminish by 1999 as the country 
grappled with more serious social, economic and political issues. Once companies took note 
of this change in social priorities, the level of specific environmental disclosures was reduced. 
At the same time, companies retained the level of general disclosures and De Villiers and 
Van Staden (2006: 775) argued that these symbolic disclosures, which reflected positively on 
the company, were not costly to produce and did not attract unwarranted scrutiny7.  
 
Other than revealing the dearth of SEA studies that rely on substantive and symbolic 
management, the above review offers some helpful insights. First, the studies do lend 
credence to the symbolic and substantive conceptualisation of SEA disclosures and the role 
such disclosures might play in the legitimation process. Second, disclosures deemed to be 
‘symbolic’ continue to emerge in various settings (e.g., Islam & Deegan, 2008; Tilling & Tilt, 
2010; Bouten et al., 2011). This is in spite of criticisms that such disclosures ought to be 
discounted as public relations mechanisms captured by business ideologies and managerial 
‘speak’ (Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Spence, 2007), which suggests that symbolic disclosures 
play an important role in the legitimation process. Third, a detailed appreciation of the social, 
political and economic contexts is critical in order to ‘locate’ the societal and stakeholder 
expectations, which might then trigger changes in an organisation’s perceived legitimacy, and 
subsequently lead to changes in SEA practices. Fourth, and as argued by Ashforth and Gibbs 
(1990), maintaining/defending legitimacy is seen to be easier than acquiring it. Thus, 
corporations might be changing their SEA disclosures in response to different strategies 
emphasising a substantive or symbolic management (or a combination thereof).  
  
3.2. Brief review of prior HIV/AIDS reporting studies 
Evidence on the reporting of health programmes tends to be frequently observed in studies of 
employee and/or community disclosures (e.g., Campbell, 2000; Belal, 2001; Vuontisjarvi, 
2006), but there is virtually no research on how companies report their involvement in 
response to specific chronic illnesses or health crisis. Due to its very visible and tragic 
consequences, HIV/AIDS corporate disclosures have attracted some attention from SEA 
researchers, notably in SA. Lawrence and Samkin (2005) highlight the serious threat of 
HIV/AIDS to business and societal sustainability in SA, and examine its implications for 
corporate accountability in the light of the 2002 King Report (IOD, 2002) and GRI guidelines 
on HIV/AIDS reporting (GRI, 2003). However, they only study one company (Anglo-Gold), 
which has reported in a very comprehensive manner, and thus it is doubtful whether this one 
example is representative of SA’s corporate response. In contrast, Du Bruyn and Venter 
(2006) examine HIV/AIDS reporting among a broader sample of SA companies. They 
examine whether the recommendations of the 2002 King Report (IOD, 2002) led to more 
reporting among the top 100 companies in 2003. While a higher percentage of companies 
were providing awareness programmes (83%), detailed information relating to HIV/AIDS 
(e.g., prevalence and costs) was disclosed by only a minority of companies.  
                                                 
7
 Incidentally, De Villiers and Van Staden (2006) cite the case of HIV/AIDS as an important and emerging 
national concern. Consistent with their interpretation of the decline in environmental disclosures, one might 
expect an increase in disclosures relating to emerging social concerns, such as HIV/AIDS.         
 
 10
 
The findings of recent studies by Du Bruyn (2008) and Barako et al. (2010) on HIV/AIDS in 
SA and other African corporations, respectively, are generally consistent with those of past 
SA studies. Although these studies do provide an indication of HIV/AIDS reporting practices, 
there has, however, only been limited theory-based analysis of the trends and nature of these 
practices. Noticeably, and based on an analysis of the GRI guidelines and selected interviews, 
Lawrence and Samkin (2005) contend that the implications of the GRI may spur companies 
to adopt a more ethical and sustainable stance in running their business activities, but there is 
no sufficient evidence to support this claim. The current study, therefore, does not only seek 
to extend, but also to improve upon prior studies by conducting an extensive analysis using 
the proposed framework described in Section 2.2. Since an understanding of the societal 
attitudes in which symbolic and/or substantive disclosures are deployed is an important part 
of the analysis, we now present an explanation of the social, economic, and political context 
of SA insofar as it relates to the role of corporations and the impact of HIV/AIDS.  
 
4. HIV/AIDS and South Africa: Context and Corporate Responses  
Among the world’s developing regions, Sub-Saharan Africa lies at the epicentre of the AIDS 
epidemic8 and prevalence levels in the region are particularly high (Dickinson & Stevens, 
2005). In the case of SA, there is an agreed estimate that the number of people living with 
HIV stands at about 5.7 million (UNAIDS, 2010) relative to a population of about 49 million 
(i.e., about 12%). The number of AIDS-related deaths was estimated to be close to 100,000 in 
1999 and this reached 400,000 in 2009 (SA Department of Health, 2010: 11). A major reason 
for the high prevalence levels of the AIDS virus in SA is the legacy of a long history of 
inequalities and poor labour practices during the apartheid era, notably in the mining industry 
(Dickinson, 2004; Fig, 2005).  
 
The collapse of apartheid and the election of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1994 
generated much hope among South Africans that socio-economic problems created and 
subsequently neglected by the apartheid regime, including the HIV/AIDS epidemic, would be 
effectively addressed (De Villiers & Van Staden, 2006). However, confronted with a number 
of economic and social problems, the ANC's new affiliation to neo-liberalism led to 
unprecedented levels of mass unemployment, widespread acute poverty, and increased levels 
of crime and violence (Dickinson, 2004). By 2000, the true magnitude of the social 
challenges, particularly the HIV/AIDS pandemic facing the country, had become more 
visible (Fig, 2005). According to the SA Department of Health (2007: 22) estimates, 
HIV/AIDS prevalence trends increased more than threefold, from 7.6% in 1994 to 24.5% in 
2000.    
 
Despite this, ANC leaders dithered and failed to adopt policies that could robustly deal with 
the spread of the virus (Mahajan et al., 2007). In addition, leading ANC figures, including its 
president, Thabo Imbeku, exacerbated the problem by publicly questioning the link between 
HIV and AIDS (Dickinson, 2004). Similarly, the Health Minister, Manto Tshabalala-
Msimang, publicly cast serious doubts on the effectiveness of anti-retroviral drugs, and 
openly refused to provide anti-retroviral medication to people infected with the AIDS virus 
(Dickinson, 2004). Together with its failure to appreciate the true magnitude and 
consequences of the disease, scepticism and cynicism by the political elite ensured that 
                                                 
8
 Reportedly, about 32.5 million people live with HIV/AIDS worldwide, of which roughly 70% (22.5 million) 
live in Sub-Saharan Africa (Barako et al., 2010: 387). 
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HIV/AIDS escalated into a full-scale health pandemic. This scepticism attracted confusing 
and mixed responses from within society.  
 
Crucially, the conflicting response by the government in tackling the pandemic also masked 
an equally slow corporate response in SA to the spread of HIV/AIDS (Rampersad, 2010).  
Significantly, though, several opportunities for the SA corporations emerged from such 
government inaction. First, it granted corporate leaders the platform from which to criticise 
government policy, whilst escaping public blame for their own lukewarm response in the 
workplace (Dickinson, 2004; Fig, 2005). Second - and arguably - the government’s failure to 
take action contributed to the inability of corporate SA to appreciate the potential negative 
effects of the pandemic on corporate operations (Lawrence & Samkin, 2005) and 
subsequently its failure to develop and implement policies and programmes to tackle the 
spread of the disease among its workforce. More specifically, and rather than initiating 
serious policies and actions, the response of SA corporate leadership to early warnings of the 
threat was that of absolute indifference or denial, and, on occasions,  confrontational 
(Dickinson, 2004; Fig, 2005). Responses included summary dismissals, or threats of 
summarily dismissing HIV-positive workers, and pre-employment screening. A major cause 
of this poor corporate response was the ill-informed assumption that the disease 
predominantly affected an easily replaceable unskilled black labour force (Dickinson, 2004). 
In sum, while corporate SA failed to make any serious efforts to care for its affected 
workforce, or reduce the spread of the AIDS virus among its workers, government inaction 
proved to be an effective shield against corporate failings. Crucially, this afforded SA 
corporations the opportunity to avoid greater public scrutiny and criticism, and hence a loss 
of legitimacy (Dickinson & Stevens, 2005).  
 
After close to a decade of central government inaction and corporate inertia (except for a few 
mining companies), the adverse effects of AIDS, particularly on national and corporate 
productivity and profitability, became more acute (Mitchell & Hill, 2009). Nationally, the 
negative effects of the AIDS pandemic manifested in a number of ways; annual GDP fell as 
active labour force numbers fell (Barako et al., 2010), tax revenues shrunk while healthcare 
costs increased substantially (Du Bruyn, 2008), and average life expectancy was drastically 
shortened (CIA Factbook, 2011). Corporate SA was also affected by the AIDS epidemic 
through a variety of channels, including increased absenteeism leading to lower productivity 
and high incidences of labour turnover, resulting in the loss of skilled labour and thus 
increased costs of recruitment and training (Dickinson, 2004; Du Bruyn, 2008). These effects 
did not only contributed directly to the erosion of the competitiveness of SA companies, but 
also impacted negatively on their profitability and sustainability (Fig, 2005; Rampersad, 
2010).  
        
As a result, the ANC government was galvanised into developing more substantive measures 
to combat the spread of the virus (Dickinson, 2004; Fig, 2005). First, and in 2003, the 
government dropped its long-held position of denying the link between the AIDS virus and 
the syndrome (Dickinson, 2004) and agreed to a national roll-out of antiretroviral therapy 
(ART) and drugs to provide treatment for those infected with the virus (Fig, 2005). Second, 
and to ascertain the levels of prevalence, the government sponsored a number of national 
surveys, including household and antenatal HIV prevalence surveys, and encouraged 
companies to assess their own levels of prevalence. Third, it strengthened a number of 
employment laws and regulations to prevent corporations from discriminating against 
HIV/AIDS positive workers (Mahajan et al., 2007). Fourth, the government embarked on 
aggressive nationwide education and awareness creation, including encouraging preventive 
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campaigns and greater voluntary testing and counselling (Dickinson, 2004; Fig, 2005). This 
degree of commitment to the issue is reflected in the government’s strategic plans (SA 
Department of Health, 2007), which set out a number of ambitious targets, eventually leading 
to some positive outputs (SA Department of Health, 2010). 
 
By showing leadership and action, the government appeared to have also conveyed a sense of 
urgency to the corporate sector. Several SA companies announced the adoption of a number 
of workplace voluntary counselling and testing programmes aimed at treating, as well as 
combating the spread of the virus (Mahajan et al., 2007). In addition, a number of voluntary 
initiatives to facilitate a structured corporate response were introduced. For example, the SA 
Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS (SABCOHA) was formed to lead a national corporate 
response by aggressively encouraging the implementation of workplace programmes (Fig, 
2005; Rampersad, 2010). Similarly, corporate governance reforms mainly instigated by the 
SA Institute of Directors in 2002 (King II) (IOD, 2002) incorporated a requirement for SA 
companies to engage in comprehensive HIV/AIDS reporting. Crucially, King II 
recommended that SA companies should voluntarily comply with the 2003 GRI guidelines on 
HIV/AIDS. The latter provides 16 comprehensive ‘performance indicators’, which are 
considered to be of interest across the entire spectrum of public interest (including financial 
and social concerns), although the majority of the indicators in fact relate to workplace and 
workers’ issues (see Appendix). The development of the 2003 GRI guidelines was mainly 
informed by the South African experience and the input of local stakeholders was 
instrumental in designing the guidelines.  
 
The guidelines’ stated objective was to encourage a standardised, but incremental, approach 
to reporting and to enable stakeholders to benchmark the level of corporate response to the 
epidemic. At the same time, the development of these guidelines was motivated by concerns 
that some companies were less cognisant of, or were denying, the potential impact of the 
disease in their workplace (GRI, 2003: 5). An interesting comment in the document alludes to 
possible instances of symbolic management (concealing information, deflecting attention and 
providing partial accounts) in corporate reports; namely that,  
“Current information regarding action on HIV/AIDS is inconsistent and incomplete, 
even among large corporations which report adequately on other areas of their 
activities, such as health and safety practices. Case studies profile various 
interventions by the business community, yet information is not comprehensive... This 
absence of reliable information feeds into a “wait-and-see” culture, when what is 
widely acknowledged as needed is an early and systematic response” (GRI, 2003: 5). 
 
Nonetheless, the business response has not been an entirely positive one. Although there had 
been numerous discussions to include HIV/AIDS reporting as part of the listing requirements, 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) authorities decided not to press ahead with this 
decision on the grounds that the reliability of such information was uncertain and that the 
sensitive nature of the information could be wrongly interpreted (Lawrence & Samkin, 2005). 
Mahajan et al. (2007: 58) also suggested that some companies were reluctant to provide 
unbiased information, which may reveal sensitive aspects of their business and which may 
prompt a negative press from the media and civil society. The above contextual developments 
underline the role played by the business sector in the HIV/AIDS crisis. However, it remains 
to be seen whether corporate SEA practices actually reflected these substantive expectations.    
 
5. Data and Methods 
5.1. Data  
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We selected 75 companies listed on the JSE, which were drawn from five economic sectors: 
basic materials; consumer goods; consumer services; industrials; and technology/telecoms. 
We selected the largest 15 firms from each industry based on market capitalisation, and 
overall the selected companies represented 70% of the JSE’s market capitalisation. The 525 
annual and 62 sustainability reports were collected for the financial periods 2003 to 2009. To 
ensure accuracy in the longitudinal analysis, we included only companies listed throughout 
this period, whose annual reports were available for each year.  
 
5.2. Method  
We adopt a content analysis procedure (Unerman, 2000; Hooks & Van Staden, 2011) since it 
provides researchers with a systematic approach of codifying and classifying large amounts 
of unstructured texts. This codification and classification is appropriate when there is an 
interest in the way the message is being conveyed and when the volume of material to be 
analysed is relatively large. A systematic and consistent assessment of the disclosures allows 
the researcher(s) to highlight patterns of disclosures and any changes over time. In this 
respect, all instances where ‘HIV/AIDS’ was mentioned were scrutinised and ‘coded’ in 
terms of the following three ‘measures’:   
 
(a) Volume of disclosure: We use the number of words to measure the level of attention given 
by each company (in each year) to the HIV/AIDS theme in the annual report and in the 
sustainability reports (where applicable). Although the use of word counts does have some 
limitations (Hackston & Milne, 1996; Unerman, 2000), it provides a simple and sufficiently 
robust reflection of a company’s interest in (and changes thereof to) a specific social issue 
(Campbell et al., 2006).  
 
(b) ‘General’ quality dimension: Consistent with previous SEA studies (Hackston & Milne, 
1996; Ratanajongkol et al., 2006), we classify the HIV/AIDS disclosures of each company as 
being either declarative, quantitative (non-monetary), monetary (financial) and/or a 
combination thereof 9 . As argued by De Villiers and Van Staden (2006), declarative 
information is usually associated with vague and general statements of commitment 
(‘symbolic management’), whilst the inclusion of quantitative and/or monetary information 
will be synonymous with quality (‘substantive management’) corporate response (Hooks & 
Van Staden, 2011).  
 
(c) A more specific measure of quality involves the use of a disclosure index. Bouten et al. 
(2011: 193-194) and Hooks and Van Staden (2011) argue that the quality of information 
refers to the comprehensiveness and degree of specificity of the information, hence providing 
the reader with a sense that no important aspect has been left undisclosed (Wallace & Naser, 
1995). From the Appendix, we note that these aspects are present in the HIV/AIDS reporting 
guidelines in terms of both comprehensiveness and degree of specificity. The guidelines 
identify four generic themes (good governance, measurement monitoring and evaluation, 
workplace conditions and HIV/AIDS management, and depth/quality/sustainability of 
programmes) and 16 main ‘indicators’ that companies would be expected to report on. We 
adopt the 16 dimensions as the ‘basic’ coding instrument and the HIV/AIDS disclosures are 
scored on a binary basis (i.e., 1 if a particular dimension is disclosed and 0 if not disclosed). 
As contained in the lower section of the Appendix, the 16 main dimensions are further broken 
                                                 
9Refer to Appendix 1 of Mahadeo et al. (2011) for the coding procedures applicable to declarative, monetary 
and quantitative (and combinations thereof) disclosures.  
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down to 34 sub-dimensions, resulting in a total of 50 dimensions, which we use to evaluate 
the extent to which a company has engaged in substantive management. 
 
6. Empirical Findings and Discussion 
6.1. Extent of HIV/AIDS disclosure.  
Our initial investigation of the annual reports shows that the proportion of companies 
disclosing HIV/AIDS information did not greatly fluctuate over the period. Eighty per cent of 
companies provided disclosures in 2003 and this gradually increased to 91% in 2005. There 
was subsequently a slight downward trend to 84% by 2009, which is consistent with Du 
Bruyn and Venter’s (2006) study of the top 100 companies (e.g., 82% in 2003). In terms of 
disclosure volume, Figure 2 shows the evolution of word counts over the period of analysis.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
We observe a mean of 322 words in 2003, a notable increase over the period up to 2006 and a 
subsequent decline to 312 words by 200910. To assess the relative importance attached to the 
HIV/AIDS theme, we charted the health and safety disclosures for our SA sample. Although 
there was some fluctuation in the word counts, there is an upward trend in the health and 
safety disclosures in contrast to HIV/AIDS disclosures. This pattern of disclosures suggests 
that HIV/AIDS disclosures are the result of specific contextual influences that are not related 
to the (broader) health and safety theme.    
 
6.2. Evolution of disclosures: general qualitative dimension 
Table 1 below shows the proportion of companies that have adopted specific forms of 
HIV/AIDS disclosures (declarative, monetary and quantitative and combinations thereof) and 
the changes occurring over the seven-year period.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Initially, about half (52%) of the surveyed companies used declarative statements in relation 
to HIV/AIDS. In the majority of cases, the companies’ statements acknowledged the national 
implications of the epidemic and the impact these would have on society (e.g., employees, 
customers and suppliers). In the earlier periods, many of the companies’ disclosures were 
principally ‘statements of intent’ or ‘commitment’ signalling a corporate awareness of the 
issue and that future decisions/actions are currently being considered; which were then 
followed up by more elaborate disclosures in subsequent periods. This is akin to the symbolic 
practice of initially espousing socially acceptable goals (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990) and a 
message of conformance to ideals (Suchman, 1995), which arguably would then be followed 
by evidence of substantive management (detailed communications of actions and activities). 
Finally, there were a fair number of companies resorting to ‘boiler-plate’ statements (i.e., 
verbatim copies from previous annual reports). Overall, we can observe a decrease in the 
percentage of companies using declarative-only disclosures to 25.3% in 2009, whilst an 
increasing proportion of companies provide quantitative information as well (from 18.7% in 
2003 to 49.3% in 2009). In contrast, the proportion of companies providing the full range of 
information (declarative, monetary and quantitative) remained low (about 9% for both 2003 
and 2009), although there was a noticeable peak in this proportion in 2006/2007 (17.3% and 
18.7%, respectively).   
                                                 
10
 The slight variations in the annual number of disclosing companies did not influence the trend outlined in 
Figure 2. 
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The quantitative content included a wide range of data dealing with the scale of various 
activities (e.g., number of employees trained as counsellors). Over the latter period of the 
study, there was also an increasing use of ‘performance-related’ data comparing actual 
achievements to target achievements (e.g., the prevalence rates and proportion of staff 
registered for VCT). In a few cases, these performance data provided the basis for a 
discussion of the reasons why the target was not achieved (e.g., the stigma of HIV/AIDS). 
Information relating to monetary/financial aspects related principally to the costs/liabilities of 
various HIV/AIDS programmes funded by the company. In a small minority of cases, 
information about the projected financial impact of the epidemic on the financial bottom line 
was disclosed. Nonetheless, and irrespective of the rise and fall in the mean word counts 
during the period, Table 1 indicates a sustained qualitative change in the disclosures, 
predominantly supported by the use of quantitative data to support the disclosures. This 
signals a change from symbolic-oriented disclosures towards substantive ones. However, we 
need to consider to what extent these qualitative changes are in line with the substantive 
expectations set out by the 2003 GRI indicators.        
 
6.2. GRI indicators and scores  
Table 2 contains the percentage of companies that disclosed the relevant GRI indicator in 
their annual and/or sustainability reports.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Several notable points can be made from Table 2. Firstly, the level of adherence over time to 
specific GRI requirements is noticeably low relative to the percentage of companies which 
provided HIV/AIDS disclosures. For example, the proportion of companies disclosing their 
HIV/AIDS policy was at nearly 60% in 2003; this eventually declined to 41% by 2009, but in 
both years the percentage of companies providing HIV/AIDS disclosures was, respectively, 
80% and 84%. Secondly, and relative to 2003 levels, some GRI items have increased at 
varying degrees after seven years, especially in relation to aspects of monitoring (Indicator 4), 
programme (Indicator 9), VCT (Indicator 11), education (Indicator 13) and healthcare 
(Indicator 15). Thirdly, the proportion of companies disclosing financial information 
(Indicators 7, 8 and 10) has not materially increased except for a temporary and minor 
increase in the percentage of companies providing current cost data in 2006 (16%) - 
consistent with the use of a symbolic strategy of concealment. Fourthly, while relationships 
with various stakeholders are viewed as an important element in addressing the HIV/AIDS 
crisis, only a minority of companies explicitly specify their stakeholder(s) and the nature of 
their interaction with them (Indicators 5, 5a and 5b).   
 
Fifthly, two operational aspects relating to the prevention of HIV/AIDS (contraception:  
Indicator 14) and support for affected employees (retirement and death benefits: Indicator 16) 
have not been disclosed by many companies, except for minor increases in 2006. Finally, the 
GRI ‘additional’ indicators generally show that ‘follow-on’ information is not often provided 
in the disclosures. For instance, although companies seem very keen to disclose that they 
have adopted a particular policy (Indicator 1), they are less inclined to mention whether the 
policy was in line with relevant codes of practice. In summary, there appears to be a very 
limited and selective engagement with the requirements of the GRI guidelines, which does 
not indicate a high level of substantive management. Although Table 2 provides a very useful 
picture of adherence to the GRI’s individual indicators, it does not gauge the companies’ 
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overall level of substantive adoption of the GRI reporting guidelines. In Table 3, we provide 
the descriptive statistics for the absolute GRI scores (basic, additional and total scores).  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Based on the above findings, two main observations can be made. Firstly, the mean scores are 
consistent with our earlier evidence of very low levels of adoption of the GRI reporting 
guidelines. The highest mean scores were in 2006, but these still represented only 39% of the 
basic score (16), and 22.5% of the total score (50). Although it might be unrealistic to expect 
a 100% adherence to a set of voluntary indicators, it is noteworthy that initial improvements 
in the basic scores were not sustained over our longer period of analysis. Our results clearly 
show that companies did not comprehensively and specifically engage with the disclosure 
framework (Bouten et al., 2011). This, by extension, conveys the message that companies are 
not adopting a substantive management strategy and this challenges the very purpose of the 
2003 GRI guidelines. Secondly, the evolution of the scores shows a similar pattern to that of 
the word count disclosures (Figure 2); namely, an increase in the scores from 2003 to 2006 
and a slight decline thereafter11. We now consider these results in relation to our analytical 
framework, and as informed by the SA context. Since there is clear evidence of different 
reporting patterns over two periods (2003 to 2006/7 and 2006/7 to 2009), we split our 
analysis in line with these two time periods.    
 
6.3. First period (2003 to 2006/7): from the symbolic to the substantive to gain legitimacy  
As discussed in Section 4, it has been well documented that the SA response to HIV/AIDS 
has been slow, inadequate and patchy, both at corporate and government levels. Dickinson 
(2004) and Fig (2005) both argued that companies improved their legitimacy during the 
initial post-apartheid period by supporting the public outcry against government inaction - 
whilst being relatively slow at dealing with workplace infections. However, following 
changes in government policy from 2003 and the deepening of the HIV/AIDS crisis since the 
start of the 2000s, we argue that 2003 is a key year in signalling the end of ambiguous 
messages from the state (Dickinson & Stevens, 2005: 291), thereby contributing to a gradual 
change in societal attitudes towards HIV/AIDS. Theoretically, the pursuit of (moral) 
legitimacy relies on the identification of social values and norms that the organisation wants 
to demonstrate congruence with. Prior to 2003, however, and in the case of HIV/AIDS, 
societal norms, values and opinions appear to have been quite divided over the causes and 
consequences of HIV/AIDS, as reflected in widespread reports of stigma, denial and 
discrimination (Dickinson, 2004). 
 
In this regard, symbolic-led management appears to have been the initial strategy for 
companies as they sought to make political gains by demonstrating an affiliation to concerns 
expressed by the public over the lack of government action, while at the same time avoiding 
the moral and practical issues of dealing with the crisis. To a large extent, 2003 is 
representative of this state of affairs as over 50% of companies adopted declarative 
disclosures to express an acknowledgment of the national crisis. In addition, there is a 
relatively high proportion of companies (over 55%) disclosing information on policy, strategy, 
programme and education in 2003 (Table 2). From a structural and procedural legitimacy 
standpoint, we surmise that declarative-only information on these aspects emphasises the fact 
                                                 
11We also find reporting differences across economic sectors with the basic materials/mining sector having the 
highest volume of disclosures compared to other sectors. Nonetheless, we can still observe a general pattern of 
higher disclosures/scores from 2003 and declining levels from 2006/2007. Thus, we focus our analysis on this 
broader pattern.  
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that corporate structures and socially accepted procedures (e.g., a policy) have been adopted 
to demonstrate that the organisation is making a good effort to achieve valued ends (Suchman, 
1995: 580), although detailed information/outputs (such as quantitative assessments) about 
these ends are not provided. In the early stages of a legitimation response to a crisis, symbolic 
disclosures can thus contribute to redefine means (e.g., policies and practices) as ends (i.e., 
concrete achievements). For instance, general references to the fact that a strategy (Indicator 
2) and educational programmes (Indicator 13) have been set up are regularly made, but the 
details of the strategy (Indicators 2a & 2b) and the nature of the programmes (Indicators 13a 
& 13b) are comparatively less disclosed. In parallel, the same pattern of symbolic-led 
disclosures observed in 2003 could be related to the notion of dispositional legitimacy. The 
main constituents (employees and representative unions) affected by the epidemic might 
expect a reaction to the unfolding crisis that would ‘match’ with the companies’ public stand 
to ally themselves with civil society and trade unions against government inaction.  
 
Post-2003, the companies were faced with a more coherent set of expectations, with the 
government now ‘on board’. By relying on the concept of stakeholder salience, our analysis 
is that stakeholders, such as the government and employees/unions might have been 
nominally powerful in the SA context (De Villiers & Van Staden, 2006), but that their 
demands were not considered legitimate (e.g., the scepticism of political leaders towards the 
cause/treatment of HIV/AIDS) and the priority attributed to the crisis was not high on the 
corporate agenda (e.g., seen as only affecting black unskilled workers). Thereafter, the 
salience of HIV/AIDS-affected stakeholders was enhanced; their demands became legitimate, 
and the crisis was perceived as a clear danger to the country. In fact, the interventions 
contained within the King II report and the increased involvements of SABCOHA were 
strong indicators that a change in orientation was required (Dickinson & Stevens, 2005). The 
above-mentioned pressures translated into an increase in the disclosures, reflecting 
substantive features, such as a greater use of quantitative and/or monetary information in the 
disclosures (combined proportion of companies increasing from 28% in 2003 to 56% in 
2006). In terms of the GRI guidelines, companies adopted a policy of selective compliance, 
but at the same time there has been a qualitative change in the disclosures. Notably, the 
proportion of companies disclosing how HIV/AIDS-related activities are monitored 
(Indicator 4) almost doubled from 24% to 46.7%. Information on programmes (Indicators 9 
& 9a) has increased (77.3% and 41.3%, respectively, in 2005/2006). A similar pattern also 
applies to education (Indicators 13 and 13a) and health care (Indicators 15 and 15a in 
2006/2007).  
 
We interpret the above changes as being consistent with a shift towards a form of substantive 
management in the disclosures by a large proportion of the surveyed companies. From a 
pragmatic legitimacy perspective, the disclosures have shifted from showing a rhetorical 
disposition to stakeholders to reflecting the actual ‘exchanges’ the corporate sector is 
‘providing’ to stakeholders. By 2006/2007, the SEA disclosures thus conveyed the message 
that companies are actively acknowledging the interests of their constituents (mainly 
employees and government), thereby seeking to gain influence legitimacy. In addition, 
evidence (from the GRI scores) of tangible support in the form of training, VCT programmes 
and employee support (Indicator 12) became more prominent and can be linked to attempts at 
deriving exchange legitimacy, where support from constituents would arise as a result of the 
companies upholding their ‘end of the bargain’. This move to substantive disclosures is also 
reflective of Ashford and Gibbs’ (1990: 182) assertion that as the expectations from each 
constituency (government and unions) become more consistent with each other, then it is 
more likely that an organisation will adopt a substantive management strategy. In the case of 
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HIV/AIDs, the government’s decision to drop its opposition to the accepted causes/remedies 
of the epidemic enabled it to take a central leadership/coordination role in dealing with the 
health crisis. In turn, managers and companies, perceiving this change of circumstances, 
responded with a greater use of substantive management and disclosures.  
 
Furthermore, while a shift to substantive disclosures can best serve the accountability 
demands of specific constituents and contributes to the gaining of pragmatic legitimacy, there 
are also ‘positive’ consequences for the organisation’s moral legitimacy. Declarative 
disclosures have been supplemented by quantitative information, which expressed the scale 
of the activities and organisational performance. This suggests that the organisation is 
communicating a range of social outputs to convey the extent to which it is deeply committed 
to and affiliated with the social objective of addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Such 
behaviour can be linked to consequential legitimacy because a tendency to provide numerical 
outcomes demonstrates that a profit-seeking company is generating both financial and non-
financial outputs for all stakeholders.  
 
In addition, when he explained the implications of consequential legitimacy, Suchman (1995: 
580) suggested that organisations may favour outputs that are inherently difficult to measure 
due to ambiguities in defining such outputs. On the contrary, our findings suggest that 
companies favour the disclosure of simple outputs that can easily convey a societal 
contribution. For example, the GRI guidelines require more detailed assumptions to support 
the disclosure of prevalence rates, the HIV/AIDS-associated costs, and budget allocations 
(Indicators 6, 7, 8 and 10). Notwithstanding other symbolic-led motivations that may 
preclude the disclosure of these specific indicators (see below), we would argue that the 
relatively low level of disclosure for some of these items may be explained by a managerial 
perception that the outputs are too ‘ambiguous’ to ensure that consequential legitimacy will 
be gained as a result of their disclosure. More generally, this may explain why companies 
may avoid external models of social reporting, which requires the disclosure of numerical 
outputs that are based on a number of complex assumptions.  
 
We conclude this section by considering the case of specific GRI indicators (Indicators 3, 7, 8, 
10, and 16 associated with financial/risk elements) that appear to have been generally ignored 
by the vast majority of companies. Whilst we find that many companies tend to vaguely 
acknowledge that HIV/AIDS will have an impact on their economic performance, they have 
not provided detailed assessments of this likely impact. Lawrence and Samkin (2005) and Du 
Bruyn (2008) asserted that this absence of disclosure could be related to the negative 
consequences for the market if inaccurate or confidential information was to be released. In 
addition, and as suggested by O’Donovan (2002) and Mahajan et al. (2007), a symbolic 
strategy of concealment of financial information may be appropriate to avoid any criticism 
from certain constituents that the company is not sufficiently contributing (in financial terms) 
to their ‘cause’.  
 
6.4. Second period (2006/7 to 2009): mix of symbolic and substantive management to 
maintain legitimacy 
The gradual decline in SEA disclosures post-2006 can be observed in terms of word counts 
(Figure 2) and specific GRI indicators (Table 2). Specifically, the proportion of companies 
disclosing on policy, strategy and education (Indicators 1, 2 and 13) has decreased and, to a 
lesser extent, for items associated with stakeholders, prevalence rates, and support (Indicators 
5, 6 and 12). At the same time, the nature of SEA disclosures has continued to change from a 
declarative form to mainly a combination of declarative and quantitative disclosures (Table 1). 
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This suggests a change in the mix of substantive and symbolic management, with less 
emphasis on substantive content since a decline in GRI adherence is associated with a lack of 
completeness and specificity. Hence, companies increasingly used quantitative information, 
but the latter mostly related to ad hoc measures and simple numerical outputs that are not 
recommended by the GRI guidelines. This can be related to two contextual changes. Firstly, 
the recent country progress report by the SA Department of Health (2010) reveals a 
stabilisation of national prevalence, infection and death rates. Secondly, since 2003, there has 
been a steady increase in government resources to tackle the disease, not only in terms of 
coordinating and assessing prevalence/infection rates, but also in terms of providing ART. 
From a pragmatic legitimacy and a stakeholder salience perspective (Mitchell et al., 1997), 
we would argue that these events reflect a reduction in the ‘urgency’ of the crisis from the 
point of view of the company, resulting in less pressures and demands for exchanges with 
directly affected stakeholders (employees). From a moral legitimacy perspective, the 
stabilisation of the prevalence rates and the increasing visibility of the government as the lead 
provider of health services imply that societal concerns about the corporate response to 
HIV/AIDS have diminished. Hence, the lower volume of disclosures (and reduction in GRI 
scores) may result from a corporate re-assessment of the social and/or stakeholder attitudes 
towards the contribution of businesses in dealing with the HIV/AIDS crisis (De Villiers & 
Van Staden, 2006).  
 
Furthermore, and as stated by Suchman (1995: 600) and Ashforth and Gibbs (1990: 183), 
there are different reporting strategies that are applicable when a company moves from a 
position of gaining legitimacy to one of maintaining legitimacy. Whilst De Villiers and Van 
Staden (2006) conclude that less specific/more general disclosures are appropriate for 
maintaining legitimacy, we observe that information on specific HIV/AIDS activities 
dominate disclosures in the later years; and at the same time the proportion of companies 
providing general disclosures (e.g., policy and strategy) appears to be declining. Our findings 
are consistent with Ashforth and Gibbs’ (1990) view that organisations can rely on a 
‘routinised’ mix of symbolic and substantive management to maintain legitimacy. The 
disclosures will emphasise “…on-going role performance and symbolic assurances that all is 
well...” (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990: 183). Over time, however, and as organisational legitimacy 
becomes taken for granted, the same disclosures strategies can become ritualistic and 
eventually devoid of substantive meaning (Day & Woodward, 2004). However, our argument 
is that the stage of ‘maintaining legitimacy’ does still imply a combination of substantive and 
symbolic disclosures, but there is an expectation that in the medium to long term, symbolic 
disclosures will take predominance until a new crisis or event challenges the status quo and 
‘displaces’ the form and content of (or removes altogether) existing HIV/AIDS disclosures.  
 
7. Summary and Conclusion 
To date, there remains a significant majority of SEA studies, which seek to analyse disclosure 
patterns from a legitimacy perspective, but there has been little attempt to assess how 
particular patterns of SEA disclosures: (i) lead to which type (dynamic) of legitimacy; and (ii) 
reflect particular legitimation strategies (symbolic/substantive). Therefore, the main objective 
of this paper has been to contribute to the literature by developing an interpretive scheme, 
which combines Suchman’s (1995) dynamics of legitimacy and the concept of symbolic and 
substantive management proposed by Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) to examine how and why 
corporations rely on specific forms of SEA disclosures. Our contention is that managers will 
adopt a varying combination of symbolic and substantive disclosures that is consistent with 
the type of legitimacy being sought. In this regard, disclosures which reflect an ‘offering of 
incomplete accounts’ and the practice of concealing information are - in our view - 
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mainstream strategies of symbolic management, which explains why they appear to persist in 
annual/social reports.      
 
In addition to developing a framework for interpreting SEA disclosures generally, our study 
makes a number of specific contributions to the extant literature. First, drawing from a 
detailed analysis of HIV/AIDS reporting in SA over the period 2003-2009, our analysis 
suggests that a combination of symbolic and substantive management appears to be the 
modus operandi of companies’ social communication process insofar as the HIV/AIDS  
theme is concerned. Whilst there has been a normative expectation that companies will 
communicate their social responsibility in a substantive manner (as set out by the 2003 GRI 
guidelines), the evidence over the seven-year period of analysis suggests insufficient 
adherence to the requirement for comprehensive and comparable information. The content 
analysis also shows that an increasing proportion of companies have been including 
quantitative information together with the initially declarative-only disclosures. Although, 
however, the nature of the quantitative expectations of the GRI guidelines does not generally 
correspond with the more detailed expectations of the GRI guidelines, the observed 
disclosure strategies appear largely consistent with our interpretive framework. That is, our 
evidence mainly reflects a switch from symbolic-led SEA disclosures to a mix of symbolic 
and substantive disclosures.  
 
Further, the critical nature of the pandemic and the change in government attitudes towards 
the causes of HIV/AIDs compelled companies to respond more coherently and substantively 
to the urgent expectations of their staff, the government and society in general. As a result, 
SEA disclosures evolved as a means to pursue moral and pragmatic legitimacy, firstly from a 
procedural, structural and dispositional standpoint, and then to achieving influence, exchange 
and consequential legitimacy. Subsequently a change in the mix of disclosures (to a 
routinised mix of substantive and symbolic) occurred when organisations assessed that social 
concerns have changed (towards the role of companies in dealing with the crisis) and that the 
relevant stakeholders have become less salient as a result of changes in circumstances 
(Mitchell et al., 1997). Thus, this pattern of disclosures ensured that companies could 
maintain their pragmatic and moral legitimacy. Overall, this empirical illustration lends 
credence to our proposed interpretive framework and we argue that it can be applied to more 
mainstream SEA themes, such as environment and community support. 
  
Second, we consider the broader policy implications of our findings for the GRI. Our 
evidence suggests that the GRI guidelines have not been adopted in a comprehensive fashion 
to meet the stated objectives of completeness, comparability and transparency. Belal and 
Owen (2007) argued that international models of social reporting generally fail to bring 
substantive action because the models do not take into account local needs and expectations. 
In our case, the GRI guidelines were specifically drafted and tested in SA with the input of 
local stakeholders, yet evidence of substantive action was at best piecemeal. The recent study 
by Bouten et al. (2011) also reported a very low level of GRI adoption. We argue that 
attempts to mandate/standardise social reporting can potentially result in companies adopting 
the model primarily as a way to fit their specific legitimating agenda. Hence, we would 
caution against the development of more ‘best practice’ social reporting models to address 
the lack of comprehensive and comparable disclosure, since it is likely that companies will 
implement such models on a symbolic or, at best, on substantive/symbolic basis.  
 
Finally, there are a number of limitations which should be acknowledged. Firstly, our 
analyses have not considered other forms of corporate communications that have developed 
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over time, such as website information, but we contend that the provision of detailed 
HIV/AIDS information via other media (e.g., online reporting) is not a systematic practice 
across our sample of companies. Also, our intention was to consider the implications of the 
GRI reporting guidelines, which required the indicators to be disclosed in the 
annual/sustainability reports. Secondly, and given the very endemic nature of HIV/AIDS in 
SA, we acknowledge that there might be difficulties in generalising our empirical findings to 
other countries and in relation to other health epidemics. However, our findings arguably 
provide insights on how companies deal with health crises, and may inform future attempts at 
developing standardised forms of reporting on such social themes. Furthermore, the 
application of the analytical framework could incorporate interview-based (managers and 
other stakeholders) research, which arguably might be very useful in ascertaining and 
supporting the links between legitimacy dynamics and the resulting disclosure strategies.   
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SEA as a Means of Legitimation  
(Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990) 
 
  Symbolic Management                 Substantive Management 
 
  
For example, SEA will:  deny and/or, conceal   deflect attention  be declarative in nature  be general/minimal in nature  emphasise good news  be rhetorical in nature  offer incomplete accounts  offer accounts of ‘excuses’ to justify 
a lack of action  redefine ends and means after the 
event  project ceremonial conformity with 
accepted models of reporting 
 
 
For example, SEA will:  provide complete and 
comprehensive information  incorporate detailed 
communications of  social 
actions and activities,  provide quantitative measures 
of social performance to 
enable comparisons  provide complete and updated 
information, even if it is less 
favourable to the organisation.  comprehensively adopt 
accepted models of social 
disclosure (actual conformity)  provide financial evaluations 
of social actions 
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Figure 1: Links Between SEA as a Means of Legitimation and  Dynamics of 
Legitimacy  
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Table 1 - Classification of HIV/AIDS Disclosures (2003-2009) 
Expressed in % of surveyed companies (n = 75 ) 
Disclosure 
category 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Declarative only 52.0 44.0 42.7 
 
34.7 37.3 32.0 25.3 
Declarative and 
monetary  
0.0 2.7 1.3 0.0 1.3 2.7 1.3 
Declarative, 
monetary and 
quantitative 
9.3 12.0 13.3 17.3 18.7 10.7 9.3 
Declarative and 
quantitative 
18.7 26.7 33.3 38.7 33.3 42.7 49.3 
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Table 2 - Percentage of Surveyed Companies Providing GRI Basic Indicators and Additional  
(n=75)                                                 Indicators (AI) (2003-2009)  
GRI Item  
Indicator  
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1. Policy 58.7 48.0 53.3 54.7 53.3 46.7 41.3
AI a 13.3 13.3 12.0 13.3 9.3 9.3 5.3
AI b 9.3 16.0 20.0 20.0 17.3 14.7 6.7
2. Strategy 54.7 62.7 62.7 62.7 64.0 56.0 56
AI a 26.7 34.7 34.7 36.0 32.0 30.7 25.3
AI b 8.0 8.0 9.3 8.0 9.3 2.7 4.0
3.Contingency 5.3 5.3 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.7 2.7
AI a 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 1.3
AI b 1.3 2.7 1.3 2.7 1.3 0.0 0.0
4. Monitoring 24.0 40.0 41.3 46.7 49.3 46.7 46.7
AI a 10.7 18.7 28.0 30.7 36.0 32.0 34.7
AI b 2.7 1.3 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.7 2.7
5. Stakeholder 22.7 33.3 32.0 36 34.7 29.3 25.3
AI a 18.7 30.7 28.0 33.3 33.3 25.3 22.7
AI b 8.0 18.7 12.0 9.3 17.3 12.0 13.3
6. Prevalence 16.0 24.0 26.7 37.3 33.3 33.3 32.0
AI a 10.7 20.0 18.7 22.7 20.0 20.0 24.0
AI b 4.0 8.0 2.7 4.0 4.0 2.7 1.3
7. Current costs 9.3 13.3 12.0 16.0 14.7 13.3 10.7
AI a 1.3 2.7 1.3 4.0 5.3 4.0 1.3
AI b 2.7 2.7 1.3 2.7 1.3 1.3 2.7
8. Future costs 6.7 9.3 4.0 5.3 6.7 0.0 1.3
AI a 1.3 4.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 0.0 0.0
AI b 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
9. Programme 58.7 65.3 74.7 77.3 77.3 76.0 76.0
AI a 25.3 33.3 37.3 41.3 44.0 32.0 29.3
AI b 2.7 1.3 0.0 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.0
10. Budget 4.0 5.3 4.0 4.0 2.7 0.0 0.0
AI a 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
AI b 1.3 1.3 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
11. VCT 33.3 45.3 56.0 60.0 61.3 58.7 65.3
AI a 8.0 17.3 22.7 18.7 16.0 12.0 13.3
AI b 6.7 21.3 33.3 30.7 32.0 40.0 37.3
12. Support 38.7 46.7 49.3 54.7 49.3 53.3 49.3
AI a 9.3 9.3 20.0 25.3 21.3 17.3 12.0
AI b 14.7 21.3 18.7 21.3 17.3 14.7 13.3
13. Education 58.7 65.3 66.7 70.7 70.7 64.0 60.0
AI a 17.3 28.0 22.7 37.3 34.7 30.7 28.0
AI b 0.0 5.3 4.0 1.3 10.7 4.0 1.3
14.Contraception 14.7 24.0 16.0 22.7 18.7 17.3 18.7
AI a 1.3 5.3 4.0 2.7 0.0 1.3 1.3
AI b 6.7 2.7 2.7 6.7 6.7 5.3 6.7
15. Health care 36.0 46.7 56.0 57.3 57.3 53.3 57.3
AI a 24.0 28.0 36.0 42.7 44.0 40.0 40.0
AI b 12.0 12.0 20.0 24.0 22.7 17.3 22.7
AI c 6.7 14.7 13.3 16.0 14.7 16.0 13.3
AI d 2.7 10.7 14.7 16.0 22.7 22.7 21.3
16. Benefits 9.3 9.3 12.0 16.0 12.0 13.3 13.3
AI a 8.0 9.3 10.7 14.7 9.3 9.3 8.0
AI b 2.7 1.3 5.3 5.3 2.7 1.3 1.3
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Table 3 –  Descriptive Statistics of Absolute GRI Scores  (2003-2009) 
(n=75) 
GRI Score 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Mean  
(Standard Deviation) 
Basic Score  
(max 16) 
4.33 
(3.87) 
5.44 
(4.16) 
5.71 
(3.83) 
6.25 
(3.93) 
6.09 
(3.84) 
5.64 
(3.63) 
5.56 
(3.61) 
‘Additional’ 
Score (max 34) 
2.73 
(4.43) 
4.09 
(5.04) 
4.45 
(4.94) 
5.03 
(4.97) 
4.96 
(4.92) 
4.25 
(4.47) 
3.95 
(4.11) 
Total score  
(max 50) 
7.07 
(7.89) 
9.53 
(8.86) 
10.16 
(8.42) 
11.28 
(8.60) 
11.05 
(8.40) 
9.89 
(7.72) 
9.51 
(7.44) 
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Appendix 
Coding Instrument (Basic and ‘Additional’ Indicators) 
Adapted from GRI Reporting Guidelines [13] Indicators for HIV/AIDS 
 
Good Governance 
1. Is there reference to organisation's HIV/AIDS policy? (POLICY) 
a. information on policy meeting codes of conduct and laws. 
b. information on partnerships beyond the workplace (with specific stakeholders).  
 
2. Is there reference to an overall strategy for managing the HIV/AIDS risk? (STRATEGY) 
 a. elaboration of internal and/or external risks. 
      b. additional explanation on how the policy/strategies are communicated. 
 
3. Is there reference to the extent of preparedness and contingency planning in anticipation of 
expected HIV/AIDS impacts? (CONTINGENCY) 
 a. Information on contingency plan for employees/labour. 
 b. Information on contingency plans for markets and/or suppliers.       
 
4. Is there mention that the organisation monitors its progress and reports in terms of meeting 
strategies, policies or targets set out from 1-3 above? (MONITORING) 
 a. details on how the policy, strategy and targets are reviewed/evaluated. 
 b. explicit reference to external bodies/constituencies to whom the company reports. 
 
5. Is there mention that the organisation involves stakeholders in the formulation of policy, 
strategy and implementation? (STAKEHOLDER) 
 a. specific identification of the stakeholder groups (and representative). 
      b. mention of how are stakeholders involved (structures and budget setting etc).  
 
Measurement, Monitoring and Evaluation 
6. Indicate current (or most recent) HIV/AIDS prevalence and/or incidence rates amongst 
relevant populations (e.g., at employee level). (PREVALENCE) 
 a. evidence to enable an assessment of the reliability of prevalence rates. 
      b. information on future (projections) prevalence and/or incidence rates.  
 
7. Report current HIV/AIDS-associated costs & losses (CURRENT COSTS) 
 a. disclosure of the methods and/or assumptions used to calculate current costs/losses. 
      b. disclosure of the break-down of costs and losses.  
 
8. Indicate total assumed future HIV/AIDS-associated costs and losses. (FUTURE COSTS) 
 a. disclosure of the models and/or assumptions used to calculate future costs/losses. 
      b. disclosure of the break-down of future costs and losses.  
 
Workplace, Conditions and HIV/AIDS Management 
9. Reference to a workplace or workplace-related HIV/AIDS programmes and interventions. 
(PROGRAMME) 
 a. explicit assurance regarding confidentiality and non-discrimination. 
 b. specific disclosure of grievance and discrimination procedures available to employees. 
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10. Report total allocated budget dedicated to HIV/AIDS programmes per annum. (BUDGET) 
 a. disclosure of the breakdown of budget per programme. 
      b. Further information on the budget / funding sources for the programmes.  
 
Depth/Quality/Sustainability of Programmes 
11. Reference to the organisation's Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) programme. 
 a. specific disclosure on how programme is administered to preserve confidentiality and 
ensure non-discrimination. (VCT) 
 b. disclosure of proportion of staff utilising VCT programmes (and/or any quantitative 
measure of VCT outcomes). 
 
12. Reference to other support and counselling programmes for affected groups. (SUPPORT) 
 a. details of the available support groups. 
      b. mention of the quality of support (e.g., trained counsellors and peer educators).     
 
13. Reference to the organisation's HIV/AIDS education and training programmes. 
(EDUCATION) 
 a. detailed mention of the nature of the educational programmes.  
      b. mention how education and training is assessed for effectiveness.  
 
14. Reference to the organisation's condom and femidom distribution programmes. 
(CONTRACEPTION) 
 a. mention of educational programmes and/or communications used to encourage the use 
of contraception.  
b. mention of practical actions on making contraception available to workers. 
 
15. Reference to the organisation's general health care and wellness provision for employees 
and/or their families. (HEALTH CARE) 
 a. mention of the nature of health care provision (provider and provision of ART).  
 b. mention of preventative measures - including STD treatment.    
 c. mention of care provision made available to families. 
 d. disclosure of proportion of employees receiving anti-retroviral therapy (ART).        
 
16. Reference to additional benefits and support for employees sick, dying or deceased from 
AIDS-related conditions. (BENEFITS) 
      a. mention of benefits (retirement and work re-deployment) to employee. 
      b. mention of available family support (financial and offering work or other). 
 
Coding procedure 
 
The presence / mention of indicator scored as 1.  
No presence or mention is scored 0.  
 
Total for ‘basic’ indicator:  16 x 1     = 16  
Total for ‘additional’ indicators (AI): 15 x 2*   = 30 
 1 x 4      =   4 
 Total                  50 
* All main headings have two ‘additional’ measures except Indicator #15 (four ‘additional’ 
measures). 
